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Distance and Presence in Analogue and Digital  
Epistolary Networks 
Anthony Ross, Email: ajcross01@gmail.com 
Abstract: This paper considers the particular ways in which the familiar letter (for thousands 
of years the predominant means of communicating over distance) and twenty-first century 
technologies like the Internet differingly shaped and shape our experience of distance and 
presence. It follows Heidegger (1971), Dreyfus (2000, 2009) and Borgmann (1999, 2000) in 
critiquing the kinds of experience and action the Internet makes possible, and—by way of 
Benjamin‘s (1999a) concept of ―aura‖—argues that while mediated communication over 
distance might have never been easier, faster, or cheaper, this increase in our effective power 
comes at the cost of a diminution of the affective power of the messages carried. 
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Introduction 
As is well known, the world has shrunk. A letter sent from England to India in 1800 would likely take 
between three and six months to arrive (and sometimes much longer). When we send an email the 
same distance, it takes seconds – travelling as packets of data down fibre optic cables at something 
approaching the speed of light. Technologies which transport either our bodies or our communications 
move ever faster, bringing places closer to each other in terms of the time taken to travel or 
communicate between them and increasing our extensible opportunities for action and interaction 
(Janelle 1973: 8). This effect is commonly called ―time-space compression,‖ succinctly defined by 
Allen and Hamnett (1995: 9) as the ―reordering of distance, the overcoming of spatial barriers, the 
shortening of time-horizons, and the ability to link distant populations in a more immediate and 
intense manner.‖ The metaphor of the technological abolition of space and time is longstanding, used 
at least since Hannah More wrote in 1787 ―of ... the annihilation of space, I cannot partake,‖ 
mourning the fact that her town was not served by the new high-speed, horse-driven mail-coaches 
(Roberts 1834: 270). Today, with the extensible opportunities of the Internet, the metaphor appears to 
some as literally true. Nicholas Negroponte, for example, proclaims: ―Distance means less and less in 
the digital world. In fact, an Internet user is utterly oblivious to it‖ (Negroponte 1996: 178). The 
Internet, in such terms, requires no more than a few mouse-clicks or keystrokes to open up magical 
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access to experiences and actions anywhere in the world. The World Wide Web seems to instantiate 
the techno-utopianism of Marshall McLuhan‘s ―Global Village,‖ bringing the world closer together, 
opening access to information, and reshaping our working and social lives. 
Some philosophers like Hubert Dreyfus (2000, 2009) and Albert Borgmann (1999, 2000) take issue 
with this rhetoric and its assumptions. They criticise the kinds of experience and action the Internet 
makes possible and unite in intuiting that there are: ―fundamental differences between what is near, 
what is far, and what is neither and that issues that are moral in a broad and deep sense revolve around 
the ways we acknowledge these differences and assign them their place in our lives‖ (Borgmann 
2000: 91-92). Dreyfus and Borgmann both draw heavily upon the thought of Heidegger, for whom the 
technological annihilation of space by information technologies was a substantive concern. 
Heidegger‘s specific technological target moved with the times: in 1927‘s Being and Time, it was the 
radio (Heidegger 1962: 140); later, his ire was aimed at the television as the ―peak of this abolition of 
every possibility of remoteness‖ (Heidegger 1971: 165). We can have little doubt that his reaction to 
the rise of mobile phones and the Internet would have been similarly austere.   
This paper examines critically the concerns of Heidegger and his followers, discussing the ways in 
which modern communication technologies change our experience of distance and presence. 
Following a broad discussion of these issues, the paper narrows down in its latter half to become a 
critical comparison of the particular ways in which the familiar letter (for thousands of years the 
predominant means of communicating over distance) and twenty-first century technologies like the 
Internet differingly shaped and shape this experience. 
Heidegger on why “Short Distance is not in itself Nearness” 
Heidegger begins his 1954 essay The Thing with an evocative and provocative paradox. Time and 
space are shrinking, yet things have never been further away: 
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which 
formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information, by radio, of events 
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which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all.... Man puts the longest distances behind him 
in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before 
himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness 
does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of 
its picture on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in 
point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance 
remoteness. (Heidegger 1971: 165, original emphasis) 
The key to unlocking this passage is to understand the ways in which distance and remoteness differ 
for Heidegger, and to do so it will pay to examine his discussion of our existential spatiality in Being 
and Time (Heidegger 1962: §§22-24). In line with the general anti-Cartesian project of that work, 
Heidegger presents two very different ways of conceiving space. Firstly, there is Cartesian ―world-
space,‖ space conceived ―in a purely cognitive manner‖ (1962: 140), as an otherwise empty container 
filled by present-at-hand entities and events, a bare stage within which props are situated and actors 
act. In such a geometrically ideal space the distance between two points is both metrically 
determinable and objectively true for all people. ―Distance,‖ then, denotes for Heidegger the ontical, 
measureable space which lies between present-at-hand entities located in objective ―world-space.‖  
For Heidegger, however, the kind of space in which we mostly live is not objective in this way; we 
have a more primordial spatiality, one I will call ‗existential-space‘. How near and far things feel is 
not merely a matter of distance. I can walk a kilometre very easily, but not if it is up a mountain, or 
through five feet of snow, or if I have a bad leg.
i
 Similarly, the places which are most familiar to me—
my home, my street, my office—are not merely objective geometric spaces, they are familiar regions 
marinated with memory and meaning. Familiarity with places is what makes them ready-to-hand, it is 
why they feel intimate, comfortable, and ‗homely.‘ They are our spaces, filled with our things – things 
which have a history for us, which evoke meanings, and with which we identify. This is something 
grasped by Wordsworth in his poem Michael, about a shepherd whose 80 years amongst the green 
valleys, streams and rocks of the Lake District meant the landscape ―like a book preserv'd the 
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memory,‖ and whose fields and hills ―were his living Being even more / Than his own Blood‖ 
(Wordsworth 2000: 226). 
Our everyday spatial involvement implies a pre-thematic sense of where things are, where we are in 
relation to them and how accessible they are. My copy of Being and Time is not 35 centimetres away; 
it is at hand, lying where I left it, on my desk, between the coffee cup and the Thesaurus, ready to be 
consulted. Of course, I can measure or guess at its metric distance from my body, shifting the book 
from its readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand; but I usually do not, I just get on with my work, 
circumspectively dealing with the equipment that is helping me write this paper. In reaching for the 
book, I do not thematically measure off stretches of space and calculate whether it is worth the effort; 
the book shows up as available to me, as within reach, and needing it, I pick it up. In sum, then, we 
are not phenomenologically present in ‗world-space‘ for Heidegger; the familiar, everyday world in 
which we dwell is one of existential-space. Distance denotes merely the measurable ontical space of 
present-at-hand entities occupying any of a multiplicity of positions in objective ‗world-space.‘ 
Remoteness, on the other hand, is an ontological, substantive phenomenon we experience when we 
are engaged in our everyday, skilful coping with things as ready-to-hand: ―What is ready-to-hand in 
the environment is certainly not present-at-hand for an eternal observer exempt from Dasein: but it is 
encountered in Dasein‘s circumspectively concernful everydayness‖ (Heidegger 1962: 140).  
Heidegger distinguishes two aspects of our spatiality, de-severance and directionality. Directionality 
describes the way in which we orient ourselves towards objects, while de-severence (Ent-fernung) 
―amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, 
bringing it close‖ (139). Being startled by a sudden noise, I will naturally turn (directionality) and 
seek out (de-severance) its source. As long as something is not de-severed, it remains remote, no 
matter how close it is distantially. This does not just mean things I have no knowledge of, but also 
familiar things which have so far withdrawn in their readiness-to-hand that they are no longer 
perceptually present to me, like the spectacles ―which are so close to [me] distantially that they are 
‗sitting on [my] nose‘, [but] are environmentally more remote from [me] than the picture on the 
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opposite wall.‖ ―Such equipment,‖ says Heidegger, ―has so little closeness that often it is proximally 
quite impossible to find‖ (141). From this, we can take two things. Firstly, for Heidegger, things are 
only ―near‖ when they are both something I am concernfully engaged with and when they themselves 
are the locus of my attention (Dreyfus 1991: 134). Secondly, technology has some role to play in de-
severing the world; the spectacles (a technology) help bring close the picture on the wall (which 
would otherwise remain a blur). Equipment for seeing and hearing, in its readiness-to-hand, 
withdraws from my perception in order to bring close what would otherwise evade my perceptual 
capacities. As I speak on the phone, the receiver recedes into remoteness allowing me to bring close 
the voice of a friend. This friend is, at that moment, closer to me than my girlfriend in the next room.  
So what is Heidegger‘s objection to telecommunication technologies like radio, TV and the Internet? 
Albert Borgmann (2000: 99) gets at the root of Heidegger‘s complaint when he says that the 
technological abolition of distance ―does not so much bring near what is far as it cancels the metric of 
space and time.‖ All things become ―equally far and near,‖ Heidegger says, which is also to say that 
―everything is neither far nor near.‖ In the end, ―[e]verything gets lumped together into uniform 
distancelessness‖ (Heidegger 1971: 166). For heuristic purposes, we can break up this complaint into 
two related, though distinct, claims:  
 That the cancelling of the distinction between what is near and far compromise certain aspects 
of experience that have been traditionally important for our being, specifically our being 
bodily situated in a particular geographic, socio-cultural location.  
 That ―despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent‖ (Heidegger 
1971: 166), which is to say that information technologies do not bring things to presence in a 
sufficient way.  
We will address these points in turn in the following two sections. 
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Location, Situation, Experience 
As Merleau-Ponty (2002: 294) says in The Phenomenology of Perception, ―Being is synonymous with 
being situated.‖ To be is to be somewhere – ‘here‘ instead of ‘there.‘ Telecommunications 
technologies impact upon our sense of place in the world by making our boundaries of physical 
location more porous and mutable, and weakening the correlation between location and experience. 
Community boundaries, which have traditionally played an important role in the formation of social 
identity, become distorted as an unbounded multiplicity of social contexts open up to us. When 
Heidegger returned to his hometown of Meßkirch in 1961 to deliver a talk on the meaning of home, 
he was powerfully struck by the cornfield of radio and television aerials which had sprouted atop each 
house. He saw these antennae as symbolic of the way in which ―human beings are, strictly speaking, 
no longer ‗at home‘ where, seen from outside, they ‗live‘‖ (Heidegger, qtd. Pattison 2000: 60).  
Modern telecommunications equipment swells our spatial horizons far beyond those relatively narrow 
limits within which our ancestors dwelled, opening up possibilities for perception and action across 
the entire world. With the remote-control at hand, I can witness world-events without leaving my 
armchair, able to ―simultaneously ‗experience‘ an assassination attempt against a king in France and a 
symphony concert in Tokyo‖ (Heidegger 2000: 40). My friend in America is as near as the phone, 
while my next-door neighbour remains a stranger. What is served up by our TV screens and radios is 
―closer to man ... than his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the earth, closer than 
the change from night to day, closer than the conventions and customs of his village, than the tradition 
of his native world‖ (Heidegger 1966: 48). What this means, for Heidegger, is that ―humanity is, as it 
were, in a process of emigration. It is emigrating from what is homely [Heimisch] to what is 
unhomely [Unheimisch].‖ This erosion and erasure of ―home,‖ he feared, might lead humanity to a 
―condition of homelessness‖ (qtd. Pattison 2000: 60).  
A traditional way of life, more definitely situated and constrained by space and time, had a very 
distinct ―here,‖  the locus of perception and action, of things present to the body or within easy reach, 
and an ―away‖ which constituted the world of strangeness, myth, absence and otherness. Today, as 
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Catherine Wilson (2000: 71) argues, our technological reach is so large that the old multiplicity of 
localised ―heres‖ is ―diachronically converging to a single large ‗here.‘‖ The disorientation which can 
result from swimming in this sea of distancelessness is poetically grasped by Jerzy Kosinski in his 
novel Being There: ―Everything on TV was tangled and mixed and yet smoothed out: night and day, 
big and small, tough and brittle, soft and rough, hot and cold, near and far‖ (qtd. Malpas 2006: 279).  
Without distance, it is difficult to get a real sense of the magnitude of things or to assess their relative 
importance. If the view of the Taj Mahal from the entrance gates of its gardens could be had from the 
end of my street, or if I just have to flick a channel to see it on television, surely I will derive less 
ecstasis at seeing it than if I actually travel the miles of land and sea to see it in person. The effort we 
invest in achieving our ends has some importance for the amount of joy we derive from their 
achievement. This is not to say that things in cyberspace lack context, but that that context is much 
more mutable and fluid, being unconstrained by the limits of physical presence. Without a definite 
―here‖ and ―there,‖ the manifold of contextual relations which make up our lives and on the basis of 
which we choose to do this rather than that, to be this rather than that person, are to some extent 
diminished. If everything lies about available and easy, it is less necessary to think about what matters 
before choosing, and what we choose can matter less. 
Presentation and Re-presentation 
Heidegger‘s second objection is that ―despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains 
absent‖ (Heidegger 1971: 166). He is here suggesting that where things aren‘t disclosed in the right 
way, they are not really present for us. Here it will be helpful to distinguish between direct perceptual 
experience and indirect, or mediated, experience. In the words of Bertrand Russell (1911: 108), when 
something is just there, ―l have a direct cognitive relation to that object‖ and ―am directly aware of the 
object itself,‖ which is ―presented‖ to me. Indirect experience, on the other hand, comes second-hand 
by way of signs of some sort. To take an example, I have a painful twinge in my knee right now. I am 
aware of it because it hurts; it is directly present for me. By describing this twinge in language, I make 
you, the reader, indirectly aware of that pain. You do not feel the pain yourself, but knowing what 
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pain is and what knees are, you can approximate some impression of how I feel. Indirect experience, 
then, is mediated by description of some kind. It need not be by means of language – I could try to 
paint a picture of the pain, or create some dissonant piano-piece, or dance about on one leg; but 
however I try to convey this pain to you, I cannot make you feel it, short of bashing you on the knee 
myself (and even then I would only make you feel your pain, rather than mine). This is as much as to 
say that the ―object‖ of an experience is not presented in indirect experience, but re-presented.  
Using this distinction, it is possible to say that the voice coming through the telephone is not really my 
friend‘s voice, although it sounds a lot like it, since it has been technologically processed: sound-
waves were converted into electric pulses in one location, travelled very quickly down some long 
wires, and were then changed back to soundwaves by my telephone receiver‘s earphone. We should 
also note that in the process of being re-presented by the telephone, it is not only my friend‘s voiced 
that has been changed. The rest of her—her body with all of its expressive movements—is not present 
at all: her presence has been attenuated. In any analogic or digital process of converting physical 
objects into a re-presentation, something of the original gets necessarily lost in translation—its 
physicality, if nothing else.  
The Internet works almost exclusively on our distance senses of sight and hearing, particularly the 
former. The attenuated way in which objects show up through these channels has an obvious impact 
upon the ways we can engage with them. Viewing an indirect re-presentation of something, like a 
photograph, is to lose any chance of hearing, touching, smelling or tasting it, of seeing it in motion, of 
walking around it, or seeing its wider contextual environment outside the frame of the picture. It is to 
be unable to know what took place before or after the moment in which the photograph was taken, 
hence to be innocent of the extent to which the picture was staged beforehand or manipulated later. In 
a similar way, to communicate with an attenuated re-presentation of someone via phone or email is to 
forfeit a wealth of interactional cues which significantly aid understanding when we talk in person, 
where face and body (so indicative of identity and expressive of emotion) are visible. It is distaste for 
such attenuations of presence that ultimately underlie the concerns of Heidegger, Dreyfus and 
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Borgmann, who all fear a possible future in which mediated relationships, based on (what they 
perceive to be) shallow, projected (and perhaps delusory) images, become the norm rather than the 
exception. The extent to which mediated relationships themselves suffer the attenuations of their 
medium remains a source of conflict
ii
 that perhaps requires, ultimately, an empirical rather than a 
theoretical answer. Maintaining our theoretical stance, we can make two specific objections which 
assail the Heideggerian critique at its roots. 
Two Objections 
Firstly, we can call in the Derridean ―purity-police‖ (Scholes 1988: 285) to deconstruct the binary 
distinction between presentation and re-presentation, précising this strategy by noting that for Derrida, 
that quintessential borderer, Heidegger swaddles himself in ―the security of the near,‖ soothed by an 
―insignificant rhetoric‖ of ―proximity, of simple and immediate presence, associating with the 
proximity of Being the values of neighborhood, shelter, house‖ (Derrida 1969: 54, 51). The 
deconstructivist argument goes like this: when we talk about presence, what we really mean is a lack 
of mediation. However, as Albert Borgmann himself admits, cognitive science teaches us that ―all 
perception is mediated and processed whether the object of perception is ten light years away and 
whether it is Newtonian or electronic‖ (Borgmann 2000: 91). Even talking face-to-face, we are not 
wholly and immediately present to each other; our interaction is mediated by the space that light-
waves and sound-waves must cross to reach my eyes and ears, and indeed by our perceptual senses 
themselves. Sometimes, at our best, it might seem that we are immediately present to each other, but 
in most of life some psycho-social distance pervades our interaction: meanings get lost in translation, 
misunderstandings occur, and some measure of anxiety and reserve influence our interaction. Unless 
we could plug into each other‘s minds, our communication will always be distanced and mediated in 
some sense. By limiting their recognition of this fact, Dreyfus and Borgmann can be accused of a 
Derridean ―metaphysics of presence,‖ conceiving of the body of the thing as a ―transcendental 
signified,‖ a meaning which surpasses all signs. In Of Grammatology, Derrida argues against the 
possibility of a transcendental signified, agreeing with Charles Peirce that ―the idea of manifestation is 
the idea of a sign‖ (qtd. Derrida 1976: 49). Derrida continues: 
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The thing itself is a sign.... There is ... no phenomenality reducing the sign or the representer so that the 
thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. The so-called ―thing 
itself‖ is always already a representamen shielded from the simplicity of intuitive evidence.... From the 
moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs. (Derrida 1976: 49-50, 
original emphasis)  
The deconstructivist critique is useful in reminding us that all communication, whether face-to-face or 
technologically mediated, is a semiotic activity. Even if something or someone is physically present, I 
still have a great deal of interpretative work to do to understand it or them. Your words and actions—
whether you intend them to be or not—are mines of potential meaning, the coalface at which I labour 
to understand you. Whether I see your Porsche and guess you are rich, hear you yawn and assume that 
you are tired, or notice your ―I love Heidegger‖ t-shirt and take it that you are a fan of fundamental 
ontology, the things I am reading are signs. Viewed in this way, all interaction is mediated by signs of 
some sort, and thus the privileging of presence over representation seems less significant. We must 
not overemphasise this point, however. To do so would be to repeat a common flaw in 
deconstructivist argument, making the underlying assumption—which Richard Rorty dismisses as 
―awful‖—that because a distinction cannot be made rigorous and precise it is therefore no distinction 
at all (Rorty 1984: 22). All communication might be via signs, but in face-to-face meetings many 
more signs are available to us than through technological mediation and this fact is important. 
Moreover, being physically present in the same space remains affectively significant, something 
wonderfully summed by Dreyfus‘ statement: ―Whatever hugs do for people, I'm quite sure telehugs 
won't do it‖ (Dreyfus 2009: 68). Nearness matters. That you are here, travelled miles and miles to see 
me because I called to say I need you; that the Taj Mahal is in Agra and I must save up my money and 
book flights and ride overnight trains to see it: these things are significant. The affective experience of 
something is influenced both by our proximity to it and our difficulty in overcoming its remoteness. 
Location, situation and embodiment have experiential impact. Nevertheless, the crucial insight that all 
communication is in some sense mediated allows us to consider the imperfections of face-to-face 
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interaction and the possibility that distance can aid rather than harm interaction in some 
circumstances. This opens the liminal space for our next objection. 
Our second objection, then, is that in concentrating on the attenuations of technology we are 
insufficiently attentive to its benefits. Don Ihde‘s (1979: 21; 1990: 76) theory of the 
amplification/reduction structure of technologies claims that in the immediate employment of any 
technology, we simultaneously enhance some capacity or capacities for experience or action and 
reduce or negate others. My car speeds up my movement but attenuates my bodily movements and 
muffles the sounds and smells of the world whizzing by outside. While looking through the telescope 
I can see the scars and pockmarks of the face of the moon but cannot see my own toes. In other words, 
there is always a balance-sheet of gains and losses in the use of any technology. Heidegger and his 
heirs too often stress the negative side of this equation, fixing their philosophical sights on the lost 
possibilities for perception and action, without giving due thought to the benefits brought. Even when 
this consideration is explicitly addressed, as by Malpas (2000: 117-18), their opinion is—in my 
view—too often negative.  
That digital information presents an attenuated version of the object is obviously true; but the object 
can be remarkably enhanced in many respects. A digital image of an illuminated manuscript might 
lack many significant qualities of the original—its physicality being not the least—but the tractability 
of the image has undoubted advantages. For example, Keio University‘s Toshiyuki Takamiya (2001: 
347) lists among the benefits of that institution‘s project to digitise their copy of the Gutenberg bible 
(one of only 48 in the world): the provision of wider access to the object, preservation of the original, 
legibility enhancement where text is damaged, and the possibility of remote comparison, line by line, 
of different editions located as far afield as Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. In terms of 
communication, technologies can be perfectly sufficient, perhaps superior, for some purposes. If I 
simply need to know whether a colleague in a different building has completed some piece of work 
before I get on with a related task, would it really be preferable to have to walk over to ask them in 
person? If I have had an argument with a fractious family member and want to clear the air but know 
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that to see them now would just reignite high tempers, then I am glad to be able to take the time and 
distance to compose a letter of reconciliation, to draft and redraft and ensure the tone is exactly right. 
The most remarkable enhancement offered by these technologies remains, though, the extraordinary 
fact that we can communicate over such large distances so quickly and easily. We might well prefer to 
interact face-to-face in most circumstances, but this does not mean our new modes of communication 
can be appreciated. Consider this question: if your beloved sister were living in Bengal and you in 
England, which would you prefer, today‘s panoply of instant communicative means or just pen and 
post and a six-month wait for news? For people in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such 
a subject would have been felt very close to home—every one of the collections of family letters 
studied by Susan Whyman in her exhaustive work The Pen and the People described one or more 
family members travelling abroad or living in the colonies (Whyman 2009: 13). Even where distance 
was not insurmountable, as Konstantin Dierks attests of citizens of the emerging United States, 
although ―[p]ersonal visits and face-to-face conversation remained the ideal mode of social interaction 
... heavy workloads and busy schedules often made letter writing the only realistic alternative‖ (Dierks 
2009: 164). 
All this is to say that rather than arguing over whether face-to-face is better than mediated 
communication—in many or most situations it might well be—we should be instead assessing the 
ways in which we are made present to each other by our mediating technologies. What kinds of 
mediation are available, in what circumstances, and how does this affect the ways we interact? Having 
now mapped out the broader underlying philosophical stakes, we are now in a position to bear down, 
in what remains of this paper, upon the more particular question of what the familiar letter and 
twenty-first century technologies like the Internet bring to ‗presence.‘ 
Epistolary Presents 
The most obvious thing presented to us by letters is handwritten text and hence we should here note 
the affective resonance (in contrast to typescript) of handwriting. As Heidegger rightly says in his 
otherwise off-beam rant against the typewriter during his Parmenides lecture-course of 1942-1943, 
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―mechanical writing ... conceals the handwriting and thereby the character. The typewriter makes 
everyone look the same‖ (Heidegger 1998: 81). The cultural link between handwriting, identity and 
personality is long standing. As J. L. Austin (1975: 60) observed, our written signature on a contract 
or other document identifies us, in our bodily absence, as the ―utterance origin‖ of a speech-act. Our 
signature, and by implication our handwriting, is thus held to be a proxy for our body. As Dijck and 
Neef (2006: 15) point out, the handwritten signature is an explicit attestation of identity, ―an 
absolutely individual and non-exchangeable sign, almost as unique as fingerprints or other biometrical 
data.‖  
Our handwriting is also popularly believed to express our personality. Whether it does or not—and 
graphology is now generally dismissed as unadorned pseudoscience—the fact that graphologists 
continue to do good business in disconcerting areas like business recruitment (Greasley 2000: 47) 
indicates the strength of this association in the public mind. These associative links to the body, 
identity and personality mean that handwriting is usually considered more intimate than ‗impersonal‘ 
typed writing. Even in the days of pen and paper, letters written in one‘s own hand were thought 
warmer than those written by a third-party scribe. When we receive a personally-written letter from a 
friend, as Erasmus said, ―[w]e feel as if we were listening to them and seeing them face to face‖ (qtd. 
Daybell 2009: 651). In addition to these features of identity and personality, handwriting can convey 
significant semiotic clues which elude typed writing. Handwriting can speak of the evolution of the 
writer, most obviously in childhood, and can point towards the situation in which it was written – 
hurried handwriting could indicate the force and flow of the writer‘s feeling or their rush to meet an 
impending deadline, for example. The biographer Edmund Morris captures the complex interplay of 
all these characteristics when he says: ―Script's primary power is to convey the cursive flow of human 
thought, from brain to hand to pen to ink to eye – every waver, every loop, every character trembling 
with expression. Type has no comparable warmth‖ (qtd. Gioia 1996: 29). When we communicate 
textually today, it is for the most part by means of computer-generated typescript, and although we 
can select from a range of different fonts, this writing nonetheless loses much of the personality of 
handwriting. Still, though, since we can now hear the ―living voice‖ of the other over the telephone, 
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and even see their faces through video-calling, it would be somewhat romantic to overemphasise this 
loss.  
The symbolic value of letters extended beyond text. The kinds of materials used—paper, ink, seals 
and endorsements—could all speak of the writer‘s respect for their addressee (Daybell 2009: 654). So 
too could the layout of the page. As Jonathan Gibson (1997: 4) has shown with his formulation of 
―significant space,‖ ―honoured margins‖ and heavy spacing between salutation, body of text and 
subscription would all indicate the depth of reverence for the name and person of the addressee. These 
cues had consequence. Willemijn Ruberg (2005: 249), for example, argues convincingly that the 
formal and linguistic features of letters were an important means of expressing identity for the social 
elite of the Netherlands from 1770 to 1850, a code of inclusion and exclusion which acted to reinforce 
ideals of ‗correct‘ behaviour and manners among the Dutch upper classes.  
Benjamin and the Aura  
Letters were not merely vehicles for signs; their materiality made them gifts in themselves. Here it is 
helpful to introduce Walter Benjamin‘s notion of ―aura‖, a concept which powerfully captures some 
of the experiential changes we encounter as mechanical reproduction and digitisation blur the spatio-
temporal boundaries of things. Benjamin describes the aura as an ―ornamental halo‖ (Benjamin 2006: 
58) which attaches to persons, cultural and natural objects, and derives from their links to the 
venerations of tradition and their gathering, over the course of time, an identity and history as the 
person or thing which they are. In his most famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, Benjamin considered the way in which mechanical replicability had diminished the 
uniqueness and existential singularity of artworks and thus lessened their cultural resonance, 
authenticity and authority:  
The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its 
substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced. Since the historical 
testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive 
duration ceases to matter. And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is 
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the authority of the object. One might subsume the eliminated element in the term ―aura‖ and go on to 
say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a 
symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by 
saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By 
making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. (Benjamin 1999a: 
215) 
Any physical thing (or person) has a singular presence in time and space, ―its unique existence at the 
place where it happens to be,‖ which is the determinative setting in which it endures change, 
accumulates associations with other entities, and amasses its historical testimony  (Benjamin 1999a: 
214). The existences of people and objects can be more or less remarkable, and while all will have 
their stories to tell, a few—by the happenstances of their origin, their particular characteristics, and 
proximity to remarkable institutions, people and events—garner great cultural significance, becoming 
awe-some. The aura, says Benjamin, is a ―strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or 
semblance of distance, no matter how close the object may be‖ (Benjamin 1979: 250). The auratic 
object commands our attention while remaining remote and unapproachable. Standing out against the 
background of so many other taken-for-granted things, it has an essential otherness, an alterity which 
confronts us and commands attention, invested with ―the ability to look at us in return‖ (Benjamin 
1999b: 185). The seeming inaccessibility of the object opens a contemplative space across which it 
seems to stare back at us, invoking, questioning and affirming our reverence for the people, things and 
traditions it represents. The poets Philip Larkin and Andrew Motion describe just this emotional 
response in relation to manuscripts. For Larkin, the ―magical value‖ of manuscripts lies in the startling 
realisation that ―this is the paper [the writer] wrote on, these are the words as he wrote them, emerging 
for the first time in this particular miraculous combination‖ (Larkin 1983: 99). For Motion, it is the 
―gut-amazement of thinking, wow, Keats (or Tennyson, or Wilde, or Hardy) had this piece of paper 
when it was a blank sheet, their hand touched it, their breath swarmed all over it, and they made 
something immortal out of nothing‖ (Motion 2010: 120).  
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The manuscripts of esteemed poets, of course, derive their cultural import from the reverence we hold 
for those poets and their poems. But aura attaches not only to museum pieces and masterpieces – 
according to Benjamin (2006: 58) it ―appears in all things‖ – its experience depends on the knowledge 
and sympathies of the viewer. While it might be questioned whether the quotidian mass of familiar 
letters, in their time, held any auratic import, I would argue that this is precisely what they held for the 
one person who really mattered: their addressee. Opening your mail to find a hand-crafted letter from 
a loved-one means something to you: the experience of the aura is yours, I would not feel it. But feel 
it you can, in the touch and scent of the paper, upon which the author leant as they etched words with 
authenticity and identity in their own hand, before sending it out into the world as ―the scene, the 
stage, of [its own] fate‖ (Benjamin 1999d: 62), to journey space and time to be here now, in your 
presence. The powerful, auratic sense of presence which can be fostered by familiar letters explains 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning‘s reaction to receiving ―a letter from William Wordsworth!‖ in 1842: 
―Don‘t tell anybody but I kissed it!‖ (qtd. Milne 2010: 53). It was, moreover, described as early as the 
first-century AD, by the Roman statesman Seneca in an epistle to his friend Lucilius: 
Thank you for writing so often. By doing so you give me a glimpse of yourself in the only way you 
can. I never get a letter from you without instantly feeling we‘re together. If pictures of absent friends 
are a source of pleasure to us, refreshing the memory and relieving the sense of void with a solace 
however insubstantial and unreal, how much more so are letters, which carry marks and signs of the 
absent friend that are real. For the handwriting of a friend affords us what is so delightful about seeing 
him again, the sense of recognition. (Seneca 1969: 82) 
Letters, then, brought two things to ‗presence‘ simultaneously, symbols (words) and substrate (the 
paper they were written on). The material object carried with it something of the auratic presence of 
the author, but it also chained the message to the physical world and ensured the speed at which it 
could circulate was limited to the pace at which paper could be made to move, a fact mitigated but not 
eliminated by the coming of planes, trains and automobiles. The great communicative leap forward in 
this regard was the splitting of symbols from substrate, the conversion of messages into electric 
pulses, or light-waves, or radio-waves for conveyance via wire or radio, to be reconstituted in a 
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human-readable form at their destination. As Tom Standage rightly points out in The Victorian 
Internet (2007), the first technology to achieve this breakthrough was the electric telegraph in the mid 
nineteenth-century, which had humans convert textual messages into a binary language (Morse code) 
for transmission as electrical pulses along copper wires. The electric telegraph called for, and thus 
inaugurated, our modern project of wiring the world with lines of communication, a scheme which 
accelerated in the twentieth-century as telephones and cable television became commonplace. The 
invention of radio in the late nineteenth-century—initially called ―wireless telegraphy‖—made 
information airborne, and continues to support our mobile telephone and Wi-Fi networks.  
Since the latter half of the twentieth-century, networked computers have taken these methods of 
binary processing to a new level of efficiency. Computers deal with ―bits‖ of information—1s or 0s—
which are transported in ―packets‖ of data. In this respect, they are similar to the telegraph; but 
computers do not require humans to process signals as did the telegraph, and since computers can 
process signals with much greater accuracy and efficiency than humans, much more complex 
messages can be sent – with current processing power, we can now send not only text but also 
pictures, video, sound recordings and so on. 
Technologies like radio, telephones and computers, then, allow information to flow as fast as 
electricity, light or radio-waves, and it is this fact that underpins the pronouncements of the 
technological abolition of space and time with which we began this paper. Yet there is, as always, a 
balance-sheet of losses and gains to be reckoned in our shift towards this way of moving information. 
Yes, we have made our communications much more fluid, tractable and mobile; but we have also 
made them much less substantial and left ourselves utterly reliant on a morass of mediating 
technologies to help us render them readable. The final section examines the major implications of 
this change. 
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Digital (Im)materiality 
Edmund Husserl asserts that ―every thingly being has its place in world-space‖, a proposition he 
believes holds ―in fact and apriori for every thingly being whatever‖ (Husserl 1989: 31, original 
emphasis). Similarly, Heidegger says:  
[P]lace pertains to being itself, the place constitutes precisely the possibility of the proper presence of 
the being in question ... Each being possesses in its Being a prescription toward a determinate location 
or place. The place is constitutive of the presence of the being ... Place is something belonging to 
beings as such, their capacity to be present, a possibility which is constitutive of their Being. The place 
is the ability a being has to be there ... (Heidegger 1997: 73, 75) 
What place do digital objects like emails, text messages and blogs occupy? Where is, for example, the 
Microsoft Word document upon which I write these words? The most obvious answer would be to say 
that it is on my laptop screen, the thing I am currently seeing and interacting with. But since this on-
screen representation endures only intermittently, conjured into existence as I open the document and 
disappearing completely when I close it, this answer is incomplete. For this document is the same one 
I was working on yesterday, and that means that something of it endures even when the representation 
does not. The thing that endures is, of course, the bit-pattern, the binary code manifested as voltage 
differences in transistor cells. We could perhaps, then, try to argue that the digital object is the bit-
pattern, and that the representations it produces are merely secondary effects, like the shadows cast by 
objects in sunlight. But while the bit-pattern is the necessary causal basis for the screenic 
representations, it would be unsatisfactory to regard it alone as the digital object, since in most 
instances I remain utterly unaware of it and even if I could bring it into view it would remain 
meaningless – were I, for example, to print out a copy of the bit-pattern of this Word document, what 
I would get would not be an intelligible copy of an academic paper, but just a very long series of 1s 
and 0s. Without the ability for representation, the bit-pattern is useless; but, equally, the 
representations could not exist without the bit-pattern. We must conclude, therefore, that both together 
constitute the digital object and that, while material things have a unique presence in space and time, 
digital objects lead double lives as both perceptible on-screen representations and as imperceptible 
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bit-patterns of binary signals. This means that digital objects can never be directly presented to us, but 
only ever re-presented; they require, by their nature, the mediation of computer software and 
hardware, and lie at all times behind the screen of technology. 
The presence of digital objects is indistinct for a series of other reasons. Firstly, digital objects are 
perfectly replicable; we can create copies which are in almost every way the same as the original. 
Hence the same bit-pattern, to all intents, can be in many locations simultaneously and so it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain any straightforward distinction between digital originals and 
copies. This fact further problematises the identity, authenticity and authority of the object, already 
depreciated by mechanical reproduction. Secondly, the same representation can be in many places at 
the same time. Joohan Kim (2001: 98), for instance, gives the case of geographically dispersed 
players taking part in an online environment like Second Life, where a digital-object such as an avatar 
can be on multiple screens at the same time. Thirdly, networked computers and distributed storage 
make it possible for the composite parts of some digital objects, such as newspaper webpages, to be 
hosted on different servers in different parts of the world (Kim 2001: 98). Finally, the networked 
nature of Web documents makes it very difficult to define their boundaries. As Michael Heim rightly 
argues, the very character of hyperlinking implies the presence of other texts, which are only ever a 
mouse-click away. Indeed, Heim goes so far as to say that the Web makes all documents ―virtually 
coresident‖ and seems to collapse ―the whole notion of a primary and a secondary text, of originals 
and their references‖ (Heim 1993: 35). For these reasons, digital objects lack the determinable spatio-
temporal location of physical objects. This is, of course, a decided benefit for futurists like 
Negroponte (1996: 228), who is triumphal in declaring that ―bits will be borderless, stored and 
manipulated with absolutely no respect to geopolitical boundaries.‖ But, if we follow the logic of 
Heidegger and Husserl, it places digital objects on an unsound ontological footing. Indeed, their status 
as ―thingly beings‖ is entirely questionable, and they seem insubstantial and more akin to dreams, 
hallucinations, and ideas (Kim 2001: 107). This uncertain ontology has concrete consequences for the 
ways in which we interact with digital objects. 
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Firstly, digital objects are both more robust and more fragile than physical objects. More robust 
because the bit-pattern can in principle endure forever without degradation (though in practice bit-rot 
can occur) and because the possibility for faultless replication means that endless back-ups can be 
made – as the wonderfully named Stanford digital preservation project has it, “Lots Of Copies Keep 
Stuff Safe‖ (Reich and Rosenthal 2001). On the other hand, the fact that alteration of any part of the 
bit-pattern can markedly alter the object, the complexity of the software and hardware needed to 
render the bit-pattern readable combined with the galloping pace of technological obsolescence, and 
the fact that it can only take a keystroke to delete the bit-pattern forever, means it is has a much more 
frail existence. As Joohan Kim says, digital objects are marked by two paradoxical possibilities, 
―eternal endurance and instant vanishment‖ (Kim 2001: 100). 
Secondly, computers are bafflingly complex to the layman. To display a bit-pattern as something 
readable—as well as to transmit and store it—requires a huge amount of remarkably advanced 
software and hardware. The sheer complexity of this technology means that it remains a mystery to 
most of us, who deal with the computer as a ―black box,‖ considering little and knowing less what 
actually goes on inside the machine (as long as it is working anyway), something enabled by the now 
ubiquitous Graphic User Interface (GUI). As Sherry Turkle (2004) notes, while the first-generation of 
enthusiasts understood personal computers ―down to the bits and bytes,‖ able to ―‗open the hood‘ and 
poke around,‖ we today are far more used to ―taking things at (inter) face value.‖ The increasing 
intricacy of the technology makes us ever more reliant upon it, and while knowing how to proficiently 
operate computer programmes such as Word remains a skilful business, for most non-computer 
experts such skills never broaden beyond the sketchiest appreciation of the multitude of underlying 
technological processes at work. 
 Friedrich Kittler calls the stacks of programming languages and their underlying hardware a 
―postmodern Tower of Babel,‖ whose complexity and inscrutability mean that ―[w]e simply do not 
know what our writing does‖ (Kittler 1997: 148). Our lack of understanding of this opaque equipment 
seems to distance us from the objects we interact with when using it and gives rise to a fundamental 
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uncertainty in our dealings with them. We have no phenomenological access to the bit-pattern, being 
able only to perceive the on-screen representations, and yet most of us simply do not understand how 
the computer goes about translating the one into the other. Because we have only the re-presentations 
to rely on, we have less reason to be certain that the object we are now viewing really is the same as 
last we saw it. In physical media like letters, signs are intimately and permanently fixed to the 
substrate, and it is very difficult to remove or alter them without leaving some indication of having 
done so – black marks or holes in the paper, for example. The fluidity and ephemerality of digital 
information, meanwhile, makes it more open to imperceptible revision or deletion.  
Moreover, the complex nesting of multiple levels of coding languages mean that minor changes at one 
level can translate into very large changes at another – a small amendment to a Cascading Style Sheet, 
for example, can radically alter the look and feel of an entire website. Indeed, such minor changes 
might be all that is required to render the thing utterly unreadable, something that makes digital 
preservation particularly problematic. All of which is to say that there are fundamental reasons for 
uncertainties in our dealings with digital objects. Of course, in most of our dealings this is not a 
problem. We do not falter in fear and trembling when confronted by computers; we mostly trust the 
technology as a taken-for-granted and ready-to-hand piece of everyday equipment. Yet something of 
the uncertainty remains, and it can perhaps be felt most vividly in the gut-wrenching terror 
experienced when the representations abruptly disappear and the machine just stops working, such as 
(for Microsoft Windows users) when the ―Stop error screen,‖ commonly known as the ―blue screen of 
death,‖ appears. Such a moment of breakdown is hugely distressing because, at one and the same 
time, we realise how very little we know about this equipment and also just how dependent we are 
upon it.  
Next, lacking ―substantive duration‖ (Benjamin 1999a: 215), digital objects are poor in aura. Aura 
derives from a physical thing‘s singular presence in time and space, ―its unique existence at the place 
where it happens to be‖ (214). Digital objects are neither singular nor present; they are duplicable, 
discontinuous, and can be experienced only representationally. Being perfectly duplicable, they lack 
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the authenticity and authority of the physical object, substituting a ―plurality of copies for a unique 
existence‖ (215). The material presence of the letter was a continuity, it was the ―scene ...  of [its own] 
fate‖ (Benjamin 1999d: 62), and as it passed from hand to hand, it took with it something of the aura 
of each person and place it came into contact with. Digital representations, meanwhile, have an 
intermittent existence – they are resurrected each time we run the bit-pattern with the appropriate 
hardware and software.  Even the perceptible endurance whilst on-screen is an illusion, as what seems 
a stable on-screen object is in fact blinking in and out of existence many times per second as the 
image frames update (Hayles 2004: 79). Without a continuous spatio-temporal presence, digital 
objects cannot amass the weight of historical testimony that aura requires. It is difficult to imagine 
future scholars eulogising a writer‘s word processing documents in quite the same way as Larkin and 
Motion celebrate paper manuscripts. Certainly it will be impossible for them to wonder that ―their 
hand touched it‖ (Motion 2010: 120), since we never come into contact with digital objects, which 
remain hermetically sealed in plastic and metal. Representations remain intangible behind the screen 
and bit-patterns live invisibly in transistors. Eluding our grasp, flashing in and out of existence, and 
lacking a unique existence, digital objects eschew aura. Now, this is not necessarily a ‗bad thing.‘ 
Benjamin‘s artwork essay is, after all, commonly taken to be an affirmation of the possibilities of 
technologically-enabled mass culture and the democratisation that mechanical reproduction offers by 
allowing art ―to meet the beholder halfway‖ (Benjamin 1999a: 214). Similarly, the Internet is often 
affirmed for its potential to open up access to information, lower educational costs, promote public 
dialogue, and so on. But while it obviously compensates by way of such interactivity and tractability, 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a major losses wrought by digital technologies is the 
diminution of what Larkin identified as the ―magical value‖ of paper documents, the ―aura.‖ 
Next, there are questions to be asked about the ways in which the insubstantiality of digital messages 
might diminish perceptions of the substantiality of their contents. Many languages, including Chinese, 
Dutch and Spanish, exhibit metaphorical links between weight and importance – in English we use 
phrases like ‗the gravity of a situation‘ and ‗weighing one‘s options,‘ for example. Recent research 
into embodied cognition present persuasive evidence that this link is much more than merely 
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lingusitic, and that the weightiness of objects can have a very real effect upon perceptions of 
importance. Jostmann et al. (2009), for example, found that subjects holding a heavy clipboard while 
answering survey quesitons on a range of issues (including money, justice, and community policy) 
made higher value judgements, judged issues as more important, and invested higher levels of 
―cognitive elaboration‖ than did those subjects holding a lighter clipboard. In a similar study, 
Ackerman et al. (2010) used heavy and light clipboards to test subjects‘ reactions to the CVs of job 
applicants, finding that: ―[h]eaviness produced impressions of importance and seriousness‖ (2010: 
1714). The authors propose that “experiences with specific object-related tactile qualities elicit a 
‗haptic mindset,‘ such that touching objects triggers the application of associated concepts ... even to 
unrelated people and situations‖ (1713). Such findings suggest that the differences in affective 
response to analogue and digital messages might run deeper than auratic associative links, into the 
very substance of the thing itself. While letters are obviously not very heavy, they do at least have 
some mass, can at least be held, touched, smelled and so on; digital objects are, as we have said, 
intangible, transitory and weightless. Such may help explain affective responses like that of Herb, one 
of Sherry Turkle‘s (2011: 271) interviewees, who said: ―E-mails get deleted, but letters get stored in a 
drawer. It‘s real; it‘s tangible. Online, you can‘t touch the computer screen, but you can touch the 
letter.‖ Turkle herself seems to agree: ―An e-mail or text,‖ she says, ―seems to have been always on its 
way to the trash‖ (168). 
Conclusion 
When Heidegger spoke of the ―homelessness‖ entailed by technologies like TV and radio, he was 
anxious about what he viewed as the migration of the attention from the local to the global. Our 
―nowhereness‖ as we communicate via the Internet speaks directly to such a concern. We are 
experiencing the digital diffusion (or perhaps confusion) of the spatial presence of ourselves and the 
things we write with. Extending our perceptual and actional reach, digital technologies help us 
overcome distance and de-sever what would otherwise remain remote. But in so doing, they diminish 
the importance of bodily, geographic location (viz. time-space compression). They do not create this 
phenomenon—transportation and communication technologies from the alphabet to the aeroplane 
25 
 
have always aimed in this direction—yet, with the connective power and minimal cost of the digital, 
there nonetheless seems something of a step-change in the magnitude, if not the quality, of the effect. 
Mediated communication over distance has never been easier, faster, or cheaper. With Internet-
enabled smart-phones, we can be continually coupled to a communicative network which allows our 
attention to wander the globe, exchanging instant-messages with people in Beijing one moment and 
Boston the next. We live an increasingly distributed existence. This extended actional/perceptual 
presence, though, prompts the question of what Heidegger has called ―homelessness‖ and Borgmann a 
diminution of ―commanding presence‖.  
Digital technologies make the question of the location of our documents problematic too. Digital 
documents are ontologically ambiguous; they lead double lives. Where the letter was a material unity 
of signs etched on substrate, digitalism splits documents into two: imperceptible bits of code ghosting 
the circuits of hardware and perceptible, on-screen representations which flicker intermittently in and 
out of existence. While the familiar letter was a singular spatio-temporal object which travelled as 
―the scene, the stage, of [its own] fate‖ (Benjamin 1999d: 62), from the hand of the signatory to that 
of the addressee, carrying with it what Benjamin called the aura and there presenting (―first-hand,‖ as 
it were) the author‘s handwriting (with all the personality, individuality and authenticity that implies), 
emails and such present merely impersonal typescript which cannot be touched and, having no mass, 
may be perceived as less significant. Such points combine to hint at a loss, suggesting that our 
communicative technologies increase our effective power, but at the cost of a diminution of the 
affective power of the messages carried.  
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Notes 
                                                     
i
 Recent psychological work supports such insight. For example, Proffitt et al. (1995) found that conscious 
perceptions of hill steepness and walking distances is influenced by the wearing of heavy backpacks, while 
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) found that the age of the perceiver had a similar effect. See: Dennis R. Proffitt et al., 
'Perceiving Geographical Slant', Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2/4 (1995), 409-28; Mikul Bhalla and Dennis 
R. Proffitt, 'Visual-Motor Recalibration in Geographical Slant Perception', Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
25/4 (1999), 1076-96. 
ii
 As an anonymous reviewer observes, the crux of this debate is captured well by two articles: In their paper 
Unreal Friends, Cocking and Matthews (2000: 224) argue that ―within a purely virtual context the 
establishment of close friendship is simply psychologically impossible‖. In his reply Real Friends, Adam 
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Briggle, argues that the liminal space opened up by distance can actually promote honesty, sharing and 
(ultimately) friendship, in ways close physical contact might not. Briggle (2008: 73) comments that Cocking and 
Matthews‘ paper ultimately presents an ―implausible deterministic thesis, because the fate of online friendships 
depends at least as much on the people involved as it does on the tools used. 
